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Abstract
This paper is the result of a crowdsourced effort to surface perspectives on
the present and future direction of international finance. The authors are
researchers in financial economics who attended the INFINITI 2017 confer-
ence in the University of Valencia in June 2017 and who participated in the
crowdsourcing via the Overleaf platform. This paper highlights the actual
state of scientific knowledge in a multitude of fields in finance and proposes
different directions for future research.
Keywords: Financial Economics, Crowdsourcing, Literature Review,
Financial Research
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1. The Present State of International Financial Integration
1.1. The effect of the Global Financial Crisis on International Financial In-
tegration
The onset of the Global Financial Crisis and the subsequent response
by monetary authorities, in particular in developed countries, has brought
about several major changes to debt markets. First, there has been a sig-
nificant drop in cross-border bank lending, in particular in the interbank
lending (see for example James et al. (2014) and Batten et al. (2013)) from
around USD 12 trillion at the peak in mid 2008 to around USD 7 trillion 5
years into the crisis. On the other hand, cross-border bank lending to non-
financial corporations has been rather stable. Second, the majority of the
decline has been related to the lending between developed economies, in par-
ticular within Europe. Contrary to that, cross-border lending to emerging
economies has increased by almost 50 percent in the same period. Third,
similar developments can be observed in terms of portfolio flows, where an-
nual debt flows are at around half of what they used to be prior to the
Global Financial Crisis. Again, there is a stark contrast between developed
and emerging markets, where post crisis there has been a major increase
in portfolio flows, both equity and debt, to emerging economies. These de-
velopments indicate an important and non-transitory post crisis shift in the
financial integration ”channel” from an institutional to a more market-based
one, as well as a looser integration amongst the largest developed economies
and an increasing integration between developed and emerging markets. Fi-
nally, an important post crisis development relates to the composition and
the ownership of debt assets. Flight to quality and massive interventions of
monetary authorities raised the importance of government issued securities,
in particular in more advanced economies. As shown by Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2017), Euro area countries most severely affected by the Global
Financial Crisis exhibit a declining share of foreign government debt owners,
while the opposite holds for the large core Euro area countries. As expected,
they also show that foreign share rises with the growth rate of the economy
and the reduction of capital controls. The negative relation between foreign
share and central bank holdings in the case of advanced economies suggests
funnelling and concentration of major risks.
Higher level of financial market integration should be followed by lower-
ing the cost of capital, increasing investment opportunities, and increasing
economic growth via international risk sharing (Bekaert and Harvey (2003)).
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However, the high level of financial integration means also higher sensitivity
to global financial crises. In this light, Lehkonen (2015a) examines the ef-
fect of the 2007-2009 global financial crisis on financial integration and finds
that the effect differs amongst developed and emerging markets. In partic-
ular, the integration increased slightly for emerging markets but decreased
for developed markets during the crisis. Yarovaya et al. (2016) analysed the
patterns of intra- and inter-regional return and volatility across 10 devel-
oped and 11 emerging markets in Asia, the Americas, Europe and Africa
using both stock indices and stock index futures in the period from 2005 to
2014. The results report the increase of interconnectedness between markets
during the Global Financial Crisis and the Eurozone debt crisis. Yarovaya
et al. (2016) claim that markets are more susceptible to domestic and region-
specific volatility shocks than to inter-regional contagion. Thus for european
and american investors the best devirsification opportunities can be offered
by emerging markets from Asia. The study by Yarovaya and Lau (2016)
analyses the benefits of portfolio diversification available to UK investors in
emerging BRICS and MIST markets using conventional and regime-switch
cointegration techniques; results suggest an absence of diversification bene-
fits in the majority of seleceted emerging markets, while the most attractive
direction for invesments remains the Chinese financial market. The analysis
of decoupling and contagion hypotheses become increasingly popular in inte-
gration literature - the aim of this stream of literature is to identify markets
that can act as safe havens during crisis episodes. For example, the research
by Hkiri and Yarovaya (2017) demonstrates the decoupling of the Islamic
indices from their conventional counterparts during turbulent periods. Hkiri
and Yarovaya (2017) utilise daily data of nine regional Islamic stock indices
and their conventional counterparts for the period between 1999 and 2014
providing evidence that Islamic financial indices are a safe haven for investors
during financial crises.
1.2. Policy related integration responses to the Global Financial Crisis
The political system came up with a series of responses at the national
and transnational level. The G20 developed an international response with
the creation of the Financial Stability Board. The introduction of the Basel
III treaty by the G20 and the move to create a banking union by the Euro-
pean Union were all immediate responses. The United Kingdom has followed
an independent monetary and financial regulatory policy relative to the US
and the European Union. The Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013
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is an example of this cleaving of the UK regulatory structure. That indepen-
dence can be seen as a function of policy cyclicality, something that the Bank
of England is acutely aware of as it tries to telescope the decades and cen-
turies to learn more about preventing policy failures. This long perspective
was not present in the US Dodd-Frank Act from 2010 that addressed past
failures and added complexity (Dudley (2017)). The parliamentary process
has not yet created enough change in culture, power distribution or equitable
remedy. The recent behavioural finance programme begun by the NY Fed-
eral Reserve, aimed at improving banker habits, is a reflection of the limits
of Dodd-Frank.
At present our esteemed colleagues of the legal profession have forged
new and interesting approaches to the crisis. These startle economists and
terrify financiers, such as the newly proposed German Abwicklungsmecha-
nismusgesetz to implement the Single Resolution Mechanism. The response
has been different forms of populism in different contexts. In the US the
rise of Senator Elizabeth Warren was a response to the failures of the Dodd-
Frank Act and the partisan bickering that accompanied the publication of
the Financial Crisis Investigation Committee report in 2011 (including the
Peter Wallison externally published dissent). In the European context, the
rise of figures such as the Former Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis
and subsequently Brexit and the election of President Trump illustrates an
environment where the traditional post-war political consensus is becoming
threadbare. While this is not the focus of this paper, it is something that all
parliamentarians have become conscious of during the past 24 months. The
results in Spain, Greece, France and in the European Parliament highlighted
that the bedrock of the European project, especially in the grand consensus
EPP party, illustrate that business as usual is under concerted attack.
While that may be considered collateral damage to an economist or tech-
nocrat as part of the process of good government or ensuring that central
banking does not become a crude instrument of the political business cycle,
it does not mean that the political system will not look to intervene. It is
clear that the position of the national and supranational central bank, some-
thing which makes up a large part of the Banking Inquirys questioning, is
under examination. In the US the Fed has become the political lightning
rod. The response has been a clear questioning of the role of the lender of
last resort. Who has the power to deploy it, who has the access to it and
what countermeasures are meant to accompany it at point of request? The
unfortunate conclusion so far has been that the Lombard Street understand-
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ing of the lender of last resort has an unusual complication - the ability to
maintain a structure that is a lender of last resort relies upon it never being
required. Like the sting of the honeybee, the act of defending the financial
system is suicidal, for to use it will violate the uneasy arrangement between
the political classes and the technocrats. While this has seen swift rebuke in
the form of the US legislative environment it is only forming into a policy
position in Europe as the new Banking Union structures work their way into
national laws.
Independent central banks would protect the currency from political ma-
nipulation of the sort that destroyed so many economies in the present (such
as Argentina) and in the past (an example being Germany). In exchange for
such freedom central banks must be highly transparent and accountable to
parliament generally. In Ireland, Section 42 of the Freedom of Information
Bill 2013 exempts from Freedom of Information ”any of the supervisory di-
rectives within the meaning of the Central Bank Act 1942”. In rejecting an
amendment to counteract this secrecy the Minister stated that this was a re-
quirement of the European Central Bank. In this situation, the occlusion of
the banking sector from external scrutiny is not only facilitated by an official
body but required to be incorporated into the national body of law. Article
33AK of the Central Bank Act 1942 precludes any form of date, individual,
firm or decision identifiable notes to be produced from the materials provided
the Central Bank of Ireland to any public or non-criminal enquiry.
The challenge is that while this is taking place, reviews, such as the Bank-
ing Inquiry have no input and national parliaments have limited scrutiny over
the implementation of the new laws. That does not mean that the Financial
Trilemma of Financial Stability, International Banking, and National Finan-
cial Policies has disappeared. It has migrated to a more pliable space, in the
public discourse, within the organisations themselves and in the courts. The
role of the German Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe has been considered
of the utmost importance to the evolution of the economic constitution of
Europe. The Irish case brought by Thomas Pringle (Thomas Pringle vs.
Government of Ireland and the Attorney General C-370/12) before the court
of First Instance was one of the rare instances where a European national,
in this case a sitting member of parliament, questioned the speed and direc-
tion of travel of the undebated economic constitution of Europe. The out-
line of the economic constitution of the European Union and the Eurozone
by Advocate General Kokott was the first statement of the new framework
constructed through the Brownian motion of crisis meetings in Brussels. Im-
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portantly, except for the high officials and the highest ministers of cabinet,
all this had been presented as a fait accompli to parliaments of Europe.
Culture matters in the context of the policy response. The quality of
financial formal record keeping has come under scrutiny in many jurisdic-
tions following the GFC. There are no consistent written records or minutes
detailing the opinions of various stakeholders or a formal analysis weighing
the pros and cons of the guarantee and nationalisation decisions (Nyberg
(2011)). This lack of information severely limits our ability to understand
the rational of the decision-making and the factors considered in the pro-
cess. Without such critical information, it is hard to assess any flaws in
the rational or analysis conducted by the government. According to Finnish
economist Peter Nyberg, ”the possibility that they might experience catas-
trophic losses in asset values into the future does not appear to have been
given serious consideration even from a contingency policy point of view”
(Nyberg (2011)). Concurrent with other academic and professional analyses
of the crisis, we also contend that the blanket guarantee and inclusion of
subordinate debt was overly broad. Granted, we acknowledge the supreme
difficulty of decision-making while the crisis was unfolding. Based on the
three central papers documenting the response and management of the crisis
(Regling and Watson (2010), Honohan et al. (2010), and Nyberg (2011)),
it is apparent that there was a clear misinterpretation of the ongoing crisis
as an issue of liquidity as opposed to overall solvency. As discussed by Ny-
berg, ”there appears to have been no fears and, at most, a modest discussion
on possible underlying acute solvency problems. This is true of the banks
themselves as well as of the authorities” (Nyberg (2011)). Thus, the decision
to guarantee all debt stemmed from a fundamental misunderstanding of the
crisis at hand. The specific underpinning of this lack of information will be
further explored later in this analysis. A key and unique aspect of the Irish
bailout was the decision to guarantee dated subordinate debt. In fact, the
inclusion of such debt ”[...] was not necessary in order to protect the immedi-
ate liquidity position” (Honohan et al. (2010)). The two primary arguments
in support of inclusion centered on the idea that doing so would help banks
open new bonds and enhance the simplicity of the intervention as a whole.
The first point is open to debate, but Honohan et al. (2010) argues that such
a guarantee puts undue stress on the sovereign, potentially impacting the
domestic bond market and thus current sovereign bondholders. The second
point, however, lacks any firm theoretical basis. The decision to draw the
line between the liabilities that would be backed and those that would not
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was, according to Honohan et al. (2010), ”arbitrary”. The guarantee was
also broader than other comparable actions taken by other sovereign govern-
ments. For example, the Northern Rock guarantee only extended to existing
deposits (Honohan et al. (2010)). The European Commission responded with
a change in policy in their 2013 Banking Communication (European Com-
mission (2013)).
All of the analysis emerging from the crisis has been unequivocally critical
of principles based regulation and moral suasion. As stated in the Report
on the Crisis in the Domestic Banking Sector, ”a belief in principles-based
regulation caused the Financial Regulator to rely excessively on process over
outcomes. It engendered an unwarranted degree of complacency about the
likely performance of well-governed banks” (House of the Oireachtas Commit-
tee of Public Accounts). From the Honohan et al. (2010) report: ”In sum, the
moral suasion approach appeared to have been entirely ineffective in terms of
inducing any significant change in institutions lending behaviour”. While the
initial principle behind efficient and streamlined regulation to promote eco-
nomic growth may have been advantageous, the strategy facilitated a toxic
level of complacency that lead the financial regulatory bodies to actively ig-
nore warnings signs throughout the economy: as a result of this approach,
zero fines or penalties were enacted from 2003 to 2008 for numerous breaches
of corporate governance and regulatory principles and rules (Honohan et al.
(2010)).
Better stress testing is a key area where a more thorough empirical ap-
proach is both warranted and necessary. Stress tests are processes put in
place to simulate various economic phenomena to see if a banks portfolio
can sustain downturns in the macro economy. For example, a stress test
will evaluate how loans will perform if the economy contracted over a two-
year period to analyse the extent to which a bank is prepared for various
potential changes in the global system. Stress-testing processes by financial
regulatory bodies suffered from two primary shortcomings. First, they overly
relied on findings produced internally by financial institutions as opposed to
rigorously exploring the data independently. Second, the analyses focused on
the most likely scenarios to emerge during the time period analysed, when
the goal of a stress test is the exact opposite. Indeed, the very motivation
of a stress test is to understand what happens to a portfolio or position
when an unlikely event occurs - widespread contraction or collapses in asset
prices. Analysis conducted by financial institutions and regulatory bodies
focused on likely outcomes as opposed to low-probability events that ended
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up occurring (Honohan et al. (2010)). In statistical terms, the tail-events
were ignored on the distribution, leading to a substantial misunderstanding
of risk; another problem with the stress tests deployed were that every bank
was using completely different models that varied dramatically in rigour and
effectiveness (Honohan et al. (2010)). Though there is no perfect mechanism
that can foresee all macroeconomic risk - we can and must do better than
the lax processes in place before and during the financial crisis.
A key theme throughout the literature reviewing the financial crisis was
the continued problems that arose due to the fragmented nature of the fi-
nancial regulatory system. Confusion and dissension over the scope and
jurisdiction of the Central Bank of Ireland (CB), the Irish Financial Services
Regulatory Authority (FR), and the Department of Finance (DoF) lead to
huge gaps in the regulatory policy structure, resulting in crucial shortcomings
in terms of micro and macro prudential supervision of the financial sector.
According to Nyberg (2011), ”One possible consequence of this silo think was
that the DoF, discouraged from interfering in the work of the independent
FR and CB, remained seriously underweight in professional financial exper-
tise and engagement. The Commission considers it likely that the lack of
overall analysis and responsibility in so many Irish public institutions may
have allowed a number of warning signs to remain undetected”.
The subject of regulatory structure was addressed in the Central Bank Re-
form Act of 2010. The bill, amongst other changes, consolidated the financial
regulatory structure under the newly formed Central Bank Commission. The
Central Bank Commission now has responsibility for the totality of financial
regulatory activity, with two different Directors responsible for macroeco-
nomic stability and microprudential regulatory operations. While we ap-
plaud the fact that such a regulatory structure should hopefully strengthen
communication, information sharing, and efficiency, such a structure also
carries risk. It is important that penalties assessed during consumer protec-
tion functions are not subordinated due to the potential risk of destabilising
a financial institution. Ensuring that both mandates are carried out effec-
tively is a challenge that is perhaps exacerbated in a consolidated regulatory
environment.
1.3. Recent advances in Measuring International Financial Integration
Financial globalisation has significantly increased during the last few
decades. The increased integration of the financial systems has involved
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greater cross-border capital flows, tighter and more stable links amongst fi-
nancial markets, and greater presence of foreign financial firms around the
world. Indeed, many of the standard aggregate measures of financial global-
isation such as gross capital flows, stocks of foreign assets and liabilities, and
degree of co-movement of returns suggest that international financial integra-
tion has become widespread and has reached unprecedented levels (Watson
(1999)).
As the integration of the financial markets is not a uniform process that
significantly progressed in time, many studies analyse integration utilising
various estimation periods and varying country selections, providing evi-
dence from different methodologies. Due to the fact that integration is a
dynamic process, it is challenging to measure it. The study by Kearney and
Lucey (2004) discussed different approaches to the investigation of integra-
tion. There are two main categories of measures that can be used to evaluate
the integration of financial markets: direct measures and indirect measures.
The first approach, in other words direct measures, suggests evaluating the
extent to which the rate of returns of financial assets, with the same maturity
and risk characteristics, are equalised across financial markets. The direct
measures approach is based on the so-called law of one price, following the
logic that the lessening of regulatory barriers between markets will cause the
distribution of capital flows to the most attractive asset classes across the
globe, consequently equalising the returns on the assets with the same risk
characteristics. However, the main challenge of this approach to measuring
integration is to identify assets that are sufficiently homogenous in terms
of their risk profiles to make an adequate comparison of the equalisation of
financial markets (Kearney and Lucey (2004)).
Kearney and Lucey (2004) further divide the literature on financial inte-
gration into three categories, testing:
• The segmentation of equity markets via the international CAPM; ex-
amples can be found in Bekaert and Hodrick (1992), Campbell and
Hamao (1992), and Errunza and Padmanabhan (1992).
• The extent, and determinants, of changes in the correlation or co-
integration structure of the markets; examples being Bernard (1991);
Gilmore and McManus (2002).
• Time-varying measures of integration: Aggarwal and Muckley (2003),
Barari (2004), Bekaert and Harvey (1995), Birg and Lucey (2006),
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Forbes and Rigobon (2002), Longin and Solnik (1995), and Sheng et al.
(2017).
While the first two categories demonstrate limited attempts to measure
the time-varying nature of integration, the third category uses more sophis-
ticated methodologies to capture the dynamic linkages between markets.
In a related stream of literature, Ibrahim and Brzeszczynski (2009, 2014)
propose a Foreign Information Transmission (FIT) model, which captures
time-varying nature of interdependence relationships amongst markets and
allows for variation of parameters over time.
Financial market integration is one of the central themes in interna-
tional finance and it represents the broader concept of the complex inter-
relationships amongst different financial markets. One specific dimension of
financial integration is related to the concept of co-movement across finan-
cial markets and is interpreted in terms of the nature and extent of inter-
dependences across asset returns (Kim et al. (2006)). The literature on the
co-movements amongst international financial markets is very extensive. In
the vein of two main financial asset classes, equity and bonds, the literature
can be generally classified into three main streams:
• The first stream examines different aspects of equity market co-movement
dynamics, where examples can be found in Bessler and Yang (2003),
Brooks and Del Negro (2004), Graham and Nikkinen (2011), Kim et al.
(2005), Kiviaho et al. (2014), and Longin and Solnik (2001).
• The second stream focuses on stock-bond co-movement in a single coun-
try or multi-country context; see Andersson et al. (2008), Baur and
Lucey (2009), Cappiello et al. (2006), Connolly et al. (2005), Dimic
et al. (2016), Panchenko and Wu (2009), and Yang et al. (2009).
• Finally, the third stream focuses on the co-movement amongst interna-
tional bond markets; examples can be found in Kumar and Okimoto
(2011), Lucey and Steeley (2006), Piljak (2013), Smith (2002), and
Yang (2005).
An additional stream of related literature concentrates on determinants
of financial integration. In the vein of equity markets integration, the earlier
studies indicated that macroeconomic factors (business cycle fluctuations,
the inflation environment, and monetary policy stance) play important roles
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in explaining equity market co-movement dynamics; see for example Arajo
(2009), Cai et al. (2009), Dumas et al. (2003), and Syllignakis and Kouretas
(2011).
More recently, financial liberalisation, the institutional environment, and
global financial uncertainty have been identified as important determinants
of financial integration (see Lehkonen (2015b)).
Financial integration can be measured in three dimensions: the global,
national, and regional integration (Reddy (2002)). Global financial inte-
gration involves opening up the markets and financial institutions to free
cross-border financial services and the flow of capital. Additionally, barriers
such as capital controls, withholding taxes, and obstacles to the movement of
technology and people are removed. One of the goals of global integration is
to balance the national standards and laws across countries. The second di-
mension of integration is regional financial integration. Regional integration
arises due to ties between the countries in a certain geographic region. It is
far more achievable than global financial integration due to the tendency of
markets to concentrate in a certain geographical center. Regional integration
is important for national economies because it also promotes the develop-
ment of domestic financial markets. The most easily attainable dimension
of integration happens at the domestic level. Domestic financial integration
involves the linkage of different domestic financial segments. Some financial
institutions, such as intermediaries, help to accelerate this integration due to
their business operating concurrently in two or more market segments (e.g.
commercial banks work with savings and loan markets simultaneously).
Most of the studies on the equity market integration provide evidence of
the increasing integration in the recent two decades, there is, however, no
consensus in the literature on a well-accepted measure of integration (Puk-
thuanthong and Roll (2009)). Following early studies on market integration,
several recent papers further advanced the literature on measuring market
integration, such as Arouri et al. (2012), Bekaert et al. (2011), Carrieri et al.
(2007), Chambet and Gibson (2008), Lehkonen (2015b), and, as mentioned
earlier, Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009)).
In particular, Carrieri et al. (2007) propose a new integration measure
derived from a static asset pricing model in which expected equity returns are
linked to local and global risk factors (variances and covariances) and prices
of risk. Their model allows risk factors and prices of risk to vary through
time. Chambet and Gibson (2008) propose a model that includes global
and local factors plus a systematic emerging market factor as a measure of
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financial integration. Their financial integration measure is also enriched by
adding indicators of real activity (trade openness and trade concentration).
Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009) use a multi factor model for country equity
returns to derive a new integration measure based on an adjusted R2 from a
multi-factor model.
Berger and Pukthuanthong (2012) further expand the framework of fi-
nancial integration analysis highlighted in Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009)
by providing an estimate of systemic risk within international equity markets.
Their propose a market fragility index, which is a risk measure that recognises
periods of systemic risk and therefore, high levels of the market fragility index
indicate an increased possibility of a global financial crash. Lehkonen (2015b)
applies the same measure developed by Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009), but
expands the analysis by examining the relationship between the recent global
financial crisis and global market integration. His study provides evidence
that although equity market integration has increased over the past three
decades,the integration pattern differs amongst developed and emerging mar-
kets (integration has increased slightly for emerging markets but decreased
for developed countries during the crisis). Bekaert et al. (2011) develop a
new measure of the degree of equity market segmentation. Their measure is
based on industry-level earnings yield differentials (relative to world levels)
aggregated across all industries in a given country. Arouri et al. (2012) pro-
pose a theoretical testable capital asset pricing model for partially segmented
markets. More recently, Cordella and Ospino Rojas (2017) propose a new
measure of financial globalisation: the Financial Globalization Index (FGI).
This new measure is an asset price correlation measure based on Pukthuan-
thong and Roll (2009). The novel aspect of proposed measure relative to
Pukthuanthong and Rolls measure is that Cordella and Ospino Rojas (2017)
consider the fact that changes in the correlation between different countries
stock markets partly reflect changes in global volatility and they account for
those changes.
Some studies within the markets integration literature also investigated
the patterns of geographical changes in relative influence of financial markets
over time, in particular from the perspective of the evolution of their mutual
interdependence in the periods before and after the 2007 Global Financial
Crisis. For example, Ibrahim et al. (2017) analysed this problem for the data
from the stock markets in three main geographical regions of Europe, USA
and Asia using the Foreign Information Transmission (FIT) model (Ibrahim
and Brzeszczynski (2009)) to capture both the direct and the indirect chan-
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nels of stock-return signal-transmission mechanisms across the three major
geographical securities trading centres in London, New York and Tokyo. The
results provided by Ibrahim et al. (2017) indicate that the influence of the
US market has weakened after the Global Financial Crisis, while the role of
the main trading centres of the other two regions in Europe and Asia has
strengthened over time. These findings are consistent with the concept of a
geographical shift in the balance of economic powers between countries and
they open up a new avenue for future inter-disciplinary research at the inter-
section of such fields as: finance, economics, political science and economic
geography. Sheng et al. (2017) also report some interesting geographical pat-
terns in the return transmission mechanism across eight major international
stock markets. While considering the nature of motives to trade underly-
ing the given price movements, they find that trades originating in Asia are
more likely to be information-based, those originating in America tend to be
liquidity-based, and those originating in European markets are a mixture of
these two types.
2. Sectoral Research Responses to the Challenge
2.1. Banking, loan and Deposit Markets
Friedman (1970) professes that a company should only have one social
responsibility which is to maximise shareholders wealth in a legal manner.
He believes this sole responsibility is substantial as the profits and wealth
generated would eventually find their own way to help the public, while im-
proving the shareholders monetary circumstances. Fama and French (2002)
believe that high gearing is negatively correlated to profitability. Accord-
ingly this does not support the trade-off theory and its strong emphasis on
debt finance. In fact Drobetz and Fix (2005) also announce that profitable
firms tend to posses low leverage, due to the fact that high debt levels are
strongly associated with volatility of a companys potential earnings. Kayhan
and Titman (2007) declare that numerous companies that posses low gearing
have high profitability because of the passive accumulation of profits. There-
fore if the pecking order only promotes low leverage through association then
it must be acknowledged that this could be overlooked quite easily. Indeed
Leary and Roberts (2010) confirm that less than 20 percent of firms adhere
to the pecking orders prediction for debt and equity patterns. This is quite
understandable as from a simplistic point of view the pecking order theory
encourages the use of debt, but simultaneously it is stated that businesses
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are more likely to become profitable if they use less debt. Neville and Lucey
(2017) investigating high-tech SMEs discover that a solid, positive associ-
ation between internal finance and firm age exists, but a strong negative
relationship is apparent between the use of debt and age. This is an inter-
esting finding given previous analysis whereby internal finance alone cannot
support business investments (Westhead and Storey (1997)). Subsequently,
given that high-tech firms are amongst some of the largest in the world, yet
SMEs may only have access to internal finance, this could stifle their future
growth opportunities. Subsequently, further discussion and analysis amongst
the critical areas of the banking and equity sectors will prove fruitful.
Financial integration in traditional banking services has been more re-
served in comparison to equity or bond markets (see Degryse and Ongena
(2004)). Further scrutiny is therefore needed to understand the drivers be-
hind financial integration, or the lack of it, in banking. Are banks driven
by regulatory arbitrage opportunities, by profit motives that derive from
pronounced economies of scale, or by risk taking incentives?
Understanding these issues becomes of a paramount importance for the
smooth functioning of banking systems of countries with various levels of po-
litical, economic, or monetary integration. For example, the recent literature
on banking integration in the European Union confirms substantial fragmen-
tation along the national lines. Emter et al. (2017) analyse cross-border
banking in Europe after the global financial crisis to find that financial inte-
gration in cross-border banking has reversed to some extent after the crisis.
They identify non-performing loans as the most important factor that im-
pedes greater integration. Duijm and Schoenmaker (2017) find out that the
largest European banks did not fully grab the diversification opportunities.
Instead of diversifying into countries with dissimilar economic and financial
conditions to obtain the biggest benefit of diversification, banks rather di-
versify into countries that are similar to their home country.
During the latest global crisis the coexeedances between large banks
seems to be particularly strong in the early trading hours due to the in-
flux of overnight information, predominantly from the US. Volatility and to
certain extant general market conditions accounted for these coexeedances
Lucey and Sevic (2010). Despite fragmentation across national lines, the
European banks have diversified their exposures across the global financial
system which made them vulnerable to potential shocks stemming from the
U.S. subprime mortgage crisis. Abad et al. (2017) confirm that the European
banks have largely exposed themselves towards the non-EU entities, partic-
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ularly, shadow banking entities domiciled in the U.S. Further analysis of the
benefits and dangers of integration in banking and the impact on stability in
the banking systems is therefore needed.
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, large, complex financial
institutions pose a great threat to the global financial system (Saunders
et al. (2009)). Although these institutions facilitate international financial
integration, such global banks, due to the complexity of their operations,
require appropriate regulatory control across borders to prevent the transna-
tional financial contagion risk. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(2013b) has identified five important categories to define global systemically
important financial institutions, which could be used to obtain a score for
each bank. Appropriate additional regulatory measures can then be devel-
oped to address the issue of negative externalities from, and the spillover risks
of these significant institutions. The score methodology is based on cross-
jurisdictional activities, size, interconnectedness, substitutability/financial
infrastructure, and complexity. From the indicators of each category, one
can assess the systemic importance of global systemically important finan-
cial institutions and further investigate their spillover risks should they fail.
2.2. Equity Markets
Myers (1984) proposes that companies are inclined towards using inter-
nal finance over external sources whenever possible. This is because internal
finance is more stable and easier to control. It also has lower transaction
costs compared to the external sources, particularly equity. Cotei and Farhat
(2009) declare that equity is seen as a final option and will only be used when
a company does not have any retained earnings or debt opportunities. When
analysing high-tech SMEs, it was discovered that previous start-up experi-
ence has a key influence in the support and use of equity finance amongst
these firms (Neville and Lucey (2017)). The result of this analysis allows
for a deeper understanding of previous research whereby high quality, bet-
ter firms tended to utilise equity finance when the entrepreneurs possessed
previous experience (Garmaise (2000)). Increasing financial market inter-
connectedness has been found to be consistent with increasing equity market
integration (see for example Erb and Viskanta (1996), Forbes and Rigobon
(2002), Hardouvelis et al. (2006), or Kearney and Poti (2006)), and is seen to
be driven by markets forces, such as increasing international trade, increas-
ing business cycle synchronisation, low and convergent inflation and interest
rates etc., but constrained by regulatory barriers Aggarwal and Muckley
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(2010). Similar to the correlation between financial markets, international
equity market integration varies over time and amongst markets. It is a dy-
namic process which is often considered in literature within the context of
increasing financial liberalisation, globalisation and economic development.
According to the generic definition, as stated in Lagoarde-Segot and Lucey
(2006), the integration of financial markets means that ”all potential market
participants with the same characteristics (i) face a single set of rules when
they decide to deal with financial instruments, (ii) have equal access to these
financial instruments, and (iii) are treated equally when they are active in
the market” (Baele et al. (2004)).
More specifically, increased financial market integration manifests itself in
the absence of arbitrage opportunities amongst markets situated in different
geographical regions. Therefore, integration of financial markets leads to
an intensification of equity market interconnectedness at both intra-regional,
and inter-regional levels.
The investigation of the information transmission mechanisms, including
responses to the common macroeconomic shocks of the financial markets, as
well as transmission of shocks occurring on one of the markets compared to
other markets, are used as direct measures of integration. In Coelho et al.
(2007) the direct approach is considered to be preferable amongst researchers,
despite the complexity in finding reliable data and a method to prove the
existence of integration. One of the methods used, for example, by Coelho
et al. (2007) is a rolling and recursive minimum spanning tree (MST) to assess
the evolution of integration amongst 53 equity markets for the period from
1997 to 2006. The MST methodology provides useful visualisation of the
interconnectedness between a large set of markets, that can be also applied
dynamically to capture the evolution in patterns of stock market linkages over
time. The results obtained by ? show that developed European countries
have consistently constituted the most tightly linked markets amongst the
countries in the sample.
Birg and Lucey (2006) employ the methodology proposed by Akdogan
(1996), Akdogan (1997) and its further augmentation by Barari (2004), to
measure global equity market integration based on the international risk de-
composition model, where integration scores are calculated as a fraction of
systematic risk in total country risk vis-a`-vis the global benchmark. This
measures the contribution of a particular market to global risk. Integra-
tion scores calculation involves the use of a countrys beta against the global
benchmark portfolio (Birg and Lucey (2006)). The findings demonstrate that
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developing European markets (i.e. Estonia, Hungary, the Czech Republic,
Lithuania, and Poland) have become more integrated with both regional and
global equity markets. The comparative examination of regional and world
integration measures suggested by this methodology is highly important. Al-
though a market can become less integrated with the world, its significance
in a region may increase, consequently increasing the degree of regional in-
tegration, especially in the light of the formation of regional economic and
political alliances (Birg and Lucey (2006)).
True price discovery may be hampered by investor behaviour. Investors
continue to display a reluctance to invest in either geographic or culturally
distant countries. Although similar benefits to overseas investments can be
achieved via investment in internationalised firms (see Farooqi et al. (2015),
Fillat et al. (2015) and Krapl (2015)), investors do not seem to recognise
these benefits. Investors could invest more heavily in internationalised firms
as a hedge for domestic exposure, especially in times of declining domestic
markets. However, the opposite has been found to be the case, US investors
prefer domestic firms to internationalised firms in declining markets, whether
before or after the 2008 credit crisis, while accounting for size, risk and growth
effects. In declining markets, domestic firms outperform internationalised
firms by more than any under performance in advancing markets (Berrill
et al. (2017)).
Kearney and Lucey (2004) highlight a challenge in measuring integration,
namely in identifying assets that are comparable in terms of risk. However
cultural differences across nations present particular challenges to establish-
ing this, and has yet not been sufficiently addressed. Risk profiles are a
reflection of the difficulty of resolving asymmetric information (Hart (2001))
However the relationship between levels of asymmetric information and levels
of perceived risk are conditioned by cross-national differences in social trust
(Fukuyama (1995)). In order to have a comparison of assets across nations
there needs to be a calibration of both social trust and levels of governance.
Further, levels of both social trust and national governance are shaped by dif-
ferences in national culture (Goodell (2017), Gogolin et al. (2017)). Therefore
culture will have an impact on transaction costs. As it is difficult to compare
assets across markets that are not institutionally integrated, cultural differ-
ences establish subtle but meaningful barriers to institutional integration.
Furthermore, similarities as well as differences become visible when exam-
ining the financial integration through the lens of the IPO markets. Similar
variability in number and volume of IPO filings are prevalent for the USA,
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the UK and Germany since 2001. Especially, crises such as the burst of the
dot.com bubble or the latest global financial crisis, seem to affect the num-
bers of IPO filings and IPO withdrawals in these developed equity markets
in a similar manner (Helbing and Lucey, 2017).
In particular, the determinants of IPO success and withdrawal are of spe-
cial interest to consider financial integration of equity market interconnected-
ness at both intra-regional and inter-regional level. The recent working paper
by Helbing and Lucey (2017) identifies determinants of IPO withdrawal in
the United Kingdom and Germany from 2001 to 2015 and finds similarities
to previous US based studies as well as marked contrasts. For instance, while
Dunbar and Foerster (2008) find that underwriter reputation as well as Ven-
ture Capital involvement is key to a successful listing of an IPO, Helbing and
Lucey (2017) cannot confirm the hypothesised positive signalling effect for
the two largest and most developed equity markets in Europe. They argue
that the specific nature of the universal operations of banks in Germany in
particular combined with the immaturity of the risk capital markets in Eu-
rope are in stark contrast to the financial structures in the USA. However,
US findings are not unanimous regarding the effect of Venture Capital in-
volvement. While Busaba et al. (2001) find that backed companies are less
likely to succeed their IPO after withdrawing, Dunbar and Foerster (2008)
identify Venture Capital involvement as key for a successful return to the eq-
uity market. Considering the time period of the sample, this might support
the time-varying argument of financial integration on a national level.
Also, Helbing and Lucey (2017) find that better Corporate Governance
prior to an IPO decreases the probability of its withdrawal which supports
the US findings of Boeh and Southam (2011). Though, each country seems
to place its emphasis on individual Corporate Governance metrics, overall
the results argue in favour of financial integration in terms of Corporate
Governance and IPO markets. The analysis of Helbing and Lucey (2017)
also shows pronounced similarities in the determinants of IPO withdrawal for
the UK and Germany which enforces the argument that developed European
countries are most tightly linked (?). Further studies on financial integration
of IPO markets which examine underpricing in European countries include
Goergen et al. (2009) or Engelen and van Essen (2010).
The knowledge about interconnectedness of equity markets can be also
very helpful for stock market investors in construction of their trading strate-
gies that exploit the information not only from the domestic market, where
the trades are executed, but also from other foreign markets which spill over
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volatility and transmit returns to other markets, which are aligned next in
the particular geographical markets sequence. There exists evidence that
inclusion of the information from the foreign markets, which is measured by
models which capture interdependence and interconnectedness effects, sub-
stantially improves performance of such investment strategies (see for exam-
ple Ibrahim and Brzeszczynski (2014)).
Equity market integration is the process of unification of the markets. In-
tegrated financial markets have unified risk-adjusted returns. Equity markets
around the world have experienced increased integration in recent decades
influenced by globalization and advances in informational technology (Rosati
et al. (2017)). The global financial crises in the 1990s, and especially during
the 2000s, accelerated the process of integration amongst the equity mar-
kets. The integration process started among the developed countries. After
the worlds major equity markets became integrated to a large extent, emerg-
ing markets started the removal of restrictions and therefore boosted their
process of integration with the developed markets; a recent example for China
and Hong Kong can be found in Wu et al. (2017).
Equity markets integration brings many benefits to countries but also
some risks. The major risk of integration is the possibility of contagion:
a subject widely studied during the 1990s and 2000s global financial crises.
Contagion problems during the recent financial crises caused many researchers
to question the claimed benefits of global financial integration, and to decide
that it ultimately can bring global financial instability. The threat of sys-
tematic instability is present in the case of global and regional integration as
complications from one market are easily transferred to another.
One prominent factor influencing stock returns as well as regional and
global interconnectedness of equity markets is political uncertainty. Recent
events like the Arab Spring in the Middle East & North Africa (MENA)
region, civil war in Libya, and riots in Egypt and Tunisia during 2011, the
political and military crisis in Thailand during 2006, and the turmoil in the
Ukraine starting in 2014 are important for international investors due to their
huge impact on stock market performance in emerging countries. However,
there is only very limited empirical research testing the impact of political
risk on equity markets (Lehkonen and Heimonen (2015)).
Current literature documents that political risk is an important factor
in explaining stock returns and therefore impacts the interconnectedness of
equity markets in terms of volatility spillovers and return transmission. A
standard risk-return relationship suggests that investors demand a higher
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return for taking higher risks. Following that rationale, political risk should
be priced together with other risks and therefore should negatively impact
excess stock returns, which is confirmed in studies from Erb et al. (1996) and
Bilson et al. (2002). However, political risk is often found to violate the classic
risk-return relationship, leading to the so-called political risk sign paradox,
exemplified in situations like a reduction in political risk being associated
with higher stock returns (Diamonte et al. (1996); Perotti and van Oijen
(2001); Lehkonen and Heimonen (2015)).
Diamonte et al. (1996) further argue that political stability and upgrades
to a political risk profile lead to higher returns in an emerging market setting.
Erb et al. (1996) and Bilson et al. (2002) find that political risk has a greater
impact on returns in emerging markets than in developed markets. However,
Diamonte et al. (1996) emphasise the concept of global political risk con-
vergence, indicating that the differential impact of political risk on returns
in emerging and developed markets narrows over time. Moreover, Dimic
et al. (2015) argue that the composite political risk is negatively associated
with equity market returns, implying that higher (political) risk is associated
with lower stock market returns. For each of the components of political risk,
the effect across developed, emerging, and frontier markets can be different.
Thus further research is warranted in order to fully understand the impact of
political risk on equity returns and the interconnectedness between emerging
and developed equity markets.
2.3. Government Bond Markets
The financial integration of government bond markets is an important
topic in international finance, since it has important implications for mone-
tary policy-making independence and bond portfolio diversification (see Yang
(2005)). Despite having relevant practical implications, the topic of bond
markets’ financial integration has received less attention in the literature
than equity market integration. Most of the literature on government bond
markets integration has been traditionally focused on developed markets, es-
pecially in Eurozone and G7 economies (see for example Abad et al. (2010),
Abad et al. (2014), Christiansen (2014), Kumar and Okimoto (2011), and
Pozzi and Wolswijk (2012)).
For instance, Pozzi and Wolswijk (2012) examine the integration dynam-
ics of Euro area government bond markets. Their main finding is that the
markets were almost fully integrated before the beginning of the 2007-2009
financial crisis, but that during the crisis the degree of integration decreased.
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This is supported by Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012) who find that prior
to 2007, European sovereign bond markets mainly operated on convergence
trades, but were mainly driven by macroeconomic factors and international
risk after the crisis. Kumar and Okimoto (2011) use a sample of the largest
G7 economies (excluding Japan) to examine whether government bond mar-
kets of those countries were integrated in the period before the onset of the
crisis. In addition, they address the question to what extent the integration
at the short and long end of the yield curve differ and find that integra-
tion at the long end of the yield curve had been increasing, and that this
increase was significantly greater than at the short end. Christiansen (2014)
finds that EMU countries exhibit higher level of government bond integra-
tion than non-EMU countries. Furthermore, integration is also stronger for
old EU members relative to the new EU members. Abad et al. (2010) exam-
ine how two sources of systemic risk (world and Eurozone risk) affect bond
market integration of EMU and non-EMU members. They find that world
risk factors are more affecting government bond returns of non-EMU coun-
tries than those of EMU countries. Abad et al. (2014) show that the level of
government bond integration for all European countries is time-varying and
decreases after the beginning of the global financial crisis in August 2007.
More specifically, integration was slowing down as markets moved towards
higher segmentation following the onset of the crisis, which highlighted dif-
ferences of country risk factors across European markets. By analysing EMU
and non-EMU countries separately, they also find out that the financial crisis
had much more negative effects for EMU members sovereign bond markets
in comparison to non-EMU members.
One specific stream of the literature on bond market integration con-
centrates on emerging and frontier markets as well. For instance, Bunda
et al. (2009) use adjusted cross-country correlations to examine how common
external and idiosyncratic factors are affecting bond markets co-movement
in emerging markets, while Piljak (2013) investigates co-movement dynam-
ics of emerging and frontier government bond markets with the US market
and determinants of time-varying co-movements. More recently, Piljak and
Swinkels (2017) analyse time-variation in correlation of frontier government
bond markets (denominated in US Dollars) with respect to emerging bond
markets, the US corporate bond market, and the US Treasury.
Future research on bond market integration could focus on identifying
the most relevant determinants affecting government bond integration and
examining whether the effect of those factors differ between developed and
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emerging bond markets. Distinction between developed and emerging gov-
ernment bond markets is important in this context, given that emerging
markets bonds are often perceived as ”equity-like” assets due to high coun-
try risk (see Piljak (2013)). This implies that importance of certain deter-
minants of market integration might differ amongst developed and emerging
markets. In particular, political risk factors, development of financial system,
and sovereign credit ratings might be more significant in affecting emerging
bond markets relative to developed bond markets. Another future avenue for
research in bond market integration would be development of bond market
integration measure, which would be used to measure co-movement dynam-
ics between bond markets internationally. The creation of such a measure
is a challenging task, given the complexity of factors, both country-specific
and global, that are impacting government bond pricing on the individual
country level but also on co-movement at cross-country level.
2.4. Corporate Bond Markets
As for the government bond market, financial integration of the corporate
bond market is relevant for the transmission of monetary policy impulses and
portfolio diversification. In addition, the corporate bond market works as a
direct link between the financial and the real side of the economy, being one of
the markets where corporations can fund their own activities. However, the
empirical literature has mainly focused on the fragmentation in the sovereign
debt market, often neglecting the role of the corporate segment.
The few existing contributions, such as De Santis (2016), Horny et al.
(2016), Zaghini (2016), and Zaghini (2017), focus on the Euro-area. Indeed,
an important consequence of the turmoil in the Euro-area sovereign debt
market which started in 2010 was the transmission of the crisis to the corpo-
rate bond market. Eventually, not only banks but also firms were involved
in the crisis via the transfer risk phenomenon, experiencing a deterioration
of their funding abilities (Bedendo and Colla (2015)). The deterioration was
unequal across countries and led to an increasing market fragmentation and
segmentation along national borders.
Three empirical models to assess changes in financial market integration
can be distinguished:
1. Building on the concept of excess bond premium (EBP) by Gilchrist
and Zakrajsek (2012), the difference between the duration-adjusted
bond credit spread and the spread justified by observable credit risk,
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De Santis (2016) expands the measure to also include market risk and
idiosyncratic shocks. Relying on secondary market trades of bonds by
non-financial corporations, he proposes the degree of dispersion across
countries of domestic EBP values as a likely measure of fragmentation.
De Santis (2016) finds that fragmentation (the standard deviation of
EBP values) was very large until 2003 (especially for high yield bonds),
and declining just before the burst of the global financial crisis, reveal-
ing two peaks of almost identical size in the period after the Lehman
Brothers default and in the most acute phase of the sovereign debt
crisis (between 2011 and 2012). Having significantly declined after the
announce of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) in July 2012,
fragmentation increased again at the beginning of 2015.
2. In order to assess the degree of market fragmentation, Horny et al.
(2016) instead focus on country-specific dummies. In particular, their
econometric approach is based on dummy regressions for three main
variables:
• the countries’ fixed effect
• the bonds rating
• the slope of the term structure
By looking at the secondary market price of bonds issued by firms head
quartered in the top four Euro-area countries, they show that the spread
to German bonds is hardly ever different from zero for France, while it
peaks for Italy at the end of 2011 and for Spain at the end of 2012. They
then rely on the sum of the country (dummy) coefficients to obtain
their measure of financial market fragmentation; while fragmentation
remained fairly limited in the post Lehman period, it reached very high
levels at the heights of the Euro-area sovereign debt crisis in 2011 and
2012. Fragmentation receded gradually after the OMT but was still
detected at the beginning of 2015.
3. Zaghini (2016) argues that the best way to assess fragmentation is by
looking at the primary bond market where firms face the true cost
of funding. Relying on a model proposed by Sironi (2003) for the
Euro-area, he shows that country determinants were indeed relevant
for the pricing of corporate bonds over an extended period of time, thus
openly breaking the law of one price. By using the sum of the spread
to German bonds as the measure of fragmentation, Zaghini (2016) re-
ports that the bond market was characterised by perfect integration
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before 2007 (for each single Euro-area country), financial fragmenta-
tion erupted during the global financial crisis, increased to unprece-
dented levels during the sovereign debt crisis and declined (but not
disappeared) after the launch of the OMTs. At the end of 2014, firms
from two countries (Italy and Portugal) were still experiencing a cost
of funding which was above that implied by fundamentals. Zaghini
(2017) not only shows that fragmentation completely disappeared in
the period following the announcement of the European Central Banks
quantitative easing in January 2015, but also reports that banks are
generally not different from other companies when funding themselves
on the primary market; indeed, they have born the same market dis-
tortions as non-financial corporations.
All the above-mentioned studies suggest that the non-conventional mon-
etary policy measures deployed by the ECB were successful in reducing and
even erasing corporate bond market distortions. An interesting further re-
search avenue might want to investigate the effects of the most recent ECB
programme of asset purchases (CSPP), which contemplates the direct buying
of corporate bonds on both primary and secondary markets. In particular,
it might be useful to assess whether the role of a big player such as the ECB
playing in the market is not introducing distortions in prices or volumes (for
instance, by influencing just a market segment or discouraging bond placing
by non-eligible issuers), and whether a rebalancing channel akin to that of
the sovereign bond market is also at work in the corporate bonds market.
2.5. Equity Markets Integration
The level of integration of equity markets worldwide plays a key role for
the transmission of the benefits of global portfolio diversification and hence,
the extent to which firms are required to invest internationally to exploit such
benefits. As a result, the cross-border market for corporate control offers a
direct channel towards this principle, which ultimately offers some desirable
portfolio diversification benefits. In particular, the cross-border market for
corporate control has grown rapidly in recent years exceeding 526 billion US
Dollars in 2011 from only 99 billion US Dollars in 1990 (United Nations
(2012)).
A key issue is the impact of such growth on the costs and benefits of
firms engaged in cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CBA), which is di-
rectly related to the main incentives of firms engaged in CBAs. A rich array
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of studies in the financial economics literature shows that CBAs are largely
wealth-increasing for the shareholders of the target firms, but they are mostly
wealth-destroying, or at best wealth-neutral, for the shareholders of the ac-
quiring firm. Therefore it is unsurprising that a number of papers in various
disciplines have examined the price paid by acquirers, usually referred to as
the takeover premium, in other words, a higher purchase consideration com-
pared to the current market value. Excessive takeover premiums are often
considered as one of the reasons for the decline in acquirers’ value around
CBA announcements (Moeller et al. (2005)). Put forward, extant literature
suggests that the takeover premium in CBAs is influenced by a diverse range
of factors including:
• Managerial motivations, such as managers’ enhanced job security (Ami-
hud and Lev (1981)).
• National pride of acquiring targets based in developed countries (Hope
et al. (2011)).
• Acquiring the target firms’ characteristics, such as market access (Doukas
and Travlos (1988)), industry affiliation (Denis et al. (2002)), account-
ing quality (Bris and Cabolis (2008)), intangibility of assets (Chari
et al. (2010)), and international taxation (Huizinga et al. (2012)).
• Other deal-specific features (Eckbo (2009)).
It could also be argued that in a perfect capital market investors can
achieve the gains of global portfolio diversification by investing on the shares
of foreign firms and hence there is no need for firms to engage in CBAs.
However, owing to country specific financial regulations investors based in
certain countries might not have opportunities to invest in foreign financial
instruments due to the frictions created by the regulations. Hence, portfo-
lio investors’ ability to diversify internationally is bounded. For instance,
investors based in countries that have managed exchange rate systems are
not allowed to buy foreign currencies to invest in shares that are traded in
foreign markets. On the other hand, firms might not face such severe restric-
tions and be allowed to acquire foreign firms or shares in a foreign market.
Consequently, investors investing on the shares of domestic firms that have
foreign subsidiaries can mimic the benefit of international portfolio diversifi-
cation. Therefore, global diversification by firms can help investors to exploit
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the benefit of international diversification where portfolio diversification or
cross-country arbitrage at individual investors level is not feasible due to
regulatory restrictions in capital mobility.
Overall, previous studies suggest that while CBAs are associated with
higher takeover premiums than domestic deals, we are far from fully under-
standing the main sources of such takeover premiums. These studies have
been focused on a wide range of factors including firm, deal, and country
specific ones. An interesting research avenue that might offer meaningful
insights regarding the distribution of the takeover premium offered in CBAs
is to further explore the impact of regulatory restrictions in capital mobility.
2.6. Commodity Markets
Since the classical work by Working (1949) and Brennan (1958) on the
theory of storage, commodities have been extensively studied over the years.
In particular, Pindyck and Rotemberg (1990)’s pioneering study set the foun-
dation for the concept of co-movement: the persistence of the prices of largely
unrelated commodities to move together. This concept was later extended
by Cashin et al. (1999), who introduced a measure of so-called concordance:
the proportion of time that the prices of two commodities are simultaneously
in the same slump or boom period. More recent examples of this literature
are Ai et al. (2006) , Lescaroux (2009), Natanelov et al. (2011), De Nicola
et al. (2014), and Fernandez (2015a), amongst many others.
Irwin and Sanders (2011) detail how commodity investment flows have
increased from 15 billion US Dollars in 2003 to 250 billion US Dollars in
2009. This increase in volume is attributed to the financialisation of futures
markets that began in the early 2000s (Gogolin and Kearney (2016)). Cheng
and Xiong (2014) state that since the financialisation, commodity futures
now represent an additional asset class that sits alongside stocks and bonds.
The entrance of this new cohort of investors, however, significantly changed
how commodities interact with other assets (Adams and Glu¨ck, 2015). More
precisely, as commodities began to command a greater proportion of market
participants’ portfolios, they were traded in a manner similar to equities.
This is in contrast to earlier conclusions of commodity prices being only
weakly correlated with equity markets (Bessembinder and Chan, 1992).
Over the years new statistical techniques have been devised to gauge
co-movement amongst a set of financial assets. For instance, Kenett et al.
(2015) developed the concept of influence: the average partial correlation of
one asset with respect to others. Based on price information for the period
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of January 1968 to December 2013, Fernandez (2015b) found that there was
strong co-movement amongst the average influences of nominal returns of
industrial and precious metals since 2003. On the other hand, and as ex-
pected, average influence amongst unrelated commodity returns was found
to be generally negligible, except for the period of financial turmoil of 2007-
2010. New techniques to measure co-movement also include network theory.
See, for instance, the recent article by Diebold et al. (2017) which finds that
commodity clustering generally matches industry grouping, while energy, in-
dustrial metals, and precious metals are firmly connected.
On the other hand, it appears that in recent years a new strand of liter-
ature is under way: resources finance. That is, a bridge between the finance
and renewable/non-renewable resources literature. Here the examples are
numerous, particularly in regards to strategic metals (rare-earth elements
such as indium, iridium, rhodium) and precious metals. Recent contribu-
tions include Batten et al. (2010), Aruga and Managi (2011), Mancheri and
Marukawa (2016), O’Connor et al. (2015), Lucey et al. (2016), Ge et al.
(2016), and Lau et al. (2017) - see also the special issue on white metals in
this journal. Indeed, in that spirit, a change in the nature of white precious
metals can be observed, shifting from commodities to investment assets (Vi-
gne et al. (2017)). An interesting question is to understand whether this
reflects an actual need for more diversification assets, or whether this is a
mere reflection of a growing finance industry that turns commodities into
new products to be placed to investors. In any case, the macroeconomic
determinants of white precious metal prices are changing and so should the
views of researchers.
2.7. Risk Management
Major types of risk corporations might be exposed to include commod-
ity price risk, interest rate risk, and/or foreign exchange risk. For example
direct and indirect foreign exchange rate exposure occurs when firm value
is impacted by fluctuations in foreign exchange rates. Hutson and Steven-
son (2010) and Aggarwal and Harper (2010) suggest that the globalisation
of product markets has heightened indirect relative to direct foreign expo-
sure. Bartram et al. (2010) suggest that foreign exchange rate exposure can
be mitigated via financial and operational hedging techniques. Hutson and
Laing (2014) examine 953 US multinational firms and report strong evidence
that operational and financial hedging mitigates foreign exchange rate expo-
sure. Examining the GFC period, they find that the effectiveness of financial
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hedging diminishes and suggest that operational hedging could potentially
provide stronger protection than financial hedging during times of heighten
exchange rate volatility. Laing et al. (2017) examine the US oil and gas in-
dustry and find significant exposure to commodity price risk. They report no
evidence that operational hedging is effective; rather that financial hedging is
significant and impactful in reducing commodity price exposure. Consistent
with Hutson and Laing (2014), they find that the effectiveness of financial
hedging diminishes during times of stress. Asness et al. (2009) claim that in
2008 it was rather difficult to apply a financial hedging strategy in the con-
vertible bond markets due to the lack of liquidity. Any claim for redemption
forced market agents to sell convertible bonds and increase the ”cheapness”
of the financial asset. Accordingly, even potentially profitable strategies had
to be abandoned due to short squeeze and the necessity to close both long
and short positions. An interesting future research question is to understand
how firms operating in integrated global financial markets can successfully
mitigate risk during periods of high volatility.
2.8. FinTech
Over the last decade, technology advancement has transformed the fi-
nancial services industry at an accelerated pace. From digital currencies to
the use of Blockchain in financial transactions, the financial world is inno-
vating at a rapid pace. However, without regulation and understanding of
the technology and its impact to the sector, FinTech could do more harm
than good. There have been a number of recent papers that have studied
Bitcoin from an economics and financial perspective. For instance, Cheah
and Fry (2015) argue that if Bitcoin were a true unit of account, or a form of
store of value, it would not display such volatility expressed by bubbles and
crashes. Dwyer (2014) finds that the average monthly volatility of Bitcoin
is higher than that for gold or a set of foreign currencies, and the lowest
monthly volatilities for Bitcoin are less than the highest monthly volatility
for gold and currencies. Brire et al. (2015) show that Bitcoin offers signifi-
cant diversification benefits for investors while Dyhrberg (2016) shows that
Bitcoin has similar hedging capabilities as gold and the dollar, and as such
can be employed for risk management. Fry and Cheah (2016) develop an
econophyscis model to reveal that Bitcoin and Ripple (another cryptocur-
rency) are characterised by negative bubbles while Urquhart (2016) shows
that the Bitcoin market is inefficient. Sas and Khairuddin (2017) highlight
that the lack of regulation in Bitcoin’s crytocurrency blockchain technology
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leave users open to hacking, fraud and theft. However given the increased
attention, usage, and importance to investors, the analysis of FinTech is very
much limited.
Therefore there needs to be a growing literature on FinTech and its im-
pact on the financial sector. Possible topics include big data analytics, social
media analytics, textual sentiment analysis, agent based models and simu-
lation, Blockchain and distributed ledger technologies, disintermediation of
long established institutions such as banks, high frequency trading strate-
gies, machine learning, cryptocurrencies, digital wallets, peer-to-peer pay-
ments, financial transactions in the Internet-of-Things, asset allocation and
risk management as well as crowdfunding. While recent studies about the
implications of digital finance for individual economies exist, such as Litvack
and Vigne (2017) for India, all of the above topics outline a few areas that
academic research could pursue in this rapidly advancing field.
2.9. Alternative Investments
Another promising area for future research toward financial integration
is the area of alternative investments, such as hedge funds for example, and
the impact that they can have on the stability of the system. Currently,
hedge funds are not regulated by the be Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). They are of private nature with all the characteristics derived from it
Lhabitant (2004). As the general public has no access to this pool, regulators
don’t regard this pool as a traditional investment vehicle such as mutual
funds, portfolio stocks, bonds or cash, so there is no need to regulate them nor
any need for disclosure. Hedge fund managers are not obliged to disclose their
underlying investment practices and there is no obligation to conform to the
requirements of registered investment companies. In addition, management
may pursue a wide range of financial instruments and any type of investment
strategy even if this includes short selling, derivatives, leverage, real-estate,
non-listed or illiquid securities. In the coming years there is going to be a
pressure for more transparency and regulation towards hedge funds. This
is therefore a good opportunity to examine how these potential changes can
have an impact on how the funds operate in relation to the market operation
as well.
More specifically, an emerging area of interest is the risk capital market
with Venture Capital and Private Equity firms on an intra- and inter-regional
level. Groh et al. (2010) elaborate specific attractiveness indices for Venture
Capital and Private Equity investments on a country-specific level. Despite
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integrating markets in Europe, differences in the risk capital markets remain
severely pronounced, in particular for the largest economies (Tykvova and
Walz (2007)).
2.10. Bank liquidity
The 2007-2009 financial crisis that caused not only the collapse of the
financial system but also huge negative externalities to the entire economy
has highlighted the liquidity management problems faced by banks. When
banks fund more long-term illiquid assets with less short-term debt, they are
more likely to become unable to roll-over their borrowing during the financial
crisis (see Brunnermeier (2009), Diamond and Rajan (2009), Afonso et al.
(2011), and Acharya and Merrouche (2013)).
In the wake of the subprime crisis, banking regulations have been re-
written all over the world with the aim of gaining public trust and enhance
banking stability. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Com-
mittee on Banking Supervision (2013a)) introduced a quantity-based liquid-
ity standard, named Basel III, to strengthen bank liquidity risk manage-
ment practices. This represents a starting point to quantify individual banks
market-implied vulnerability to system-wide funding constraints during pe-
riods of stress. Acknowledging how the new liquidity standard influences the
financial sector is important in the Basel III reform process. The topic on
bank liquidity is raised at a time of significant Basel III reforms, and could
therefore propose significant contributions for future regulatory implications
before its first implementation over the next few years.
Studying banks in the Euro area, Aldasoro et al. (2017) find that increas-
ing liquidity requirement could reduce systemic risk more than higher equity
requirements could, supporting the new regulatory framework of Basel III.
Fecht et al. (2012)’s analysis indicates that financial integration could induce
banks to specialise in their lending through pooling liquidity risks in the in-
terbank market. Although the benefit of risk sharing exists, banks reliance on
the interbank market liquidity provision could rise, hence, leading to greater
contagion risk. Luo et al. (2016) is a recent study examining the impact
of financial openness on bank risk and efficiency. Considering commercial
banks in 140 countries, Luo et al. (2016) report a direct negative effect of
financial openness on profit efficiency. Bank risk is found to increase as a re-
sult of financial openness, however, indirectly through lower profit efficiency.
Liquidity is yet to be controlled for in their analysis. It could be interesting
to take into account liquidity risk/interbank market liquidity provision and
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systemically important financial institutions (identified by Basel indicators)
when investigating the interplay between financial integration, bank risk, and
bank efficiency. In this case, micro-evidence can be reported at the bank-level
for policy makers to accommodate applicable supervisory schemes.
2.11. Derivatives Markets
Merton and Bodie (1995) identify six core functions performed by the
financial system to facilitate the allocation and deployment of economic re-
sources:
1. To provide ways of clearing and settling payments to facilitate trade.
2. To provide a mechanism for the pooling of resources.
3. To provide ways to transfer economic resources across time and space.
4. To provide ways of managing risk.
5. To provide price information.
6. To provide ways of dealing with incentive problems.
Haiss and Sammer (2010) distil these functions into three derivative-
specific channels, through which derivatives influence the integration of fi-
nancial markets and economic development. Namely, the volume channel,
the efficiency channel and the risk channel.
The volume channel facilitates and increases the accumulation of cap-
ital - derivatives markets have become very successful in pooling enormous
amounts of capital. Figure 1 illustrates daily dollar volume of options on the
SPX split into call and put volumes.
The efficiency channel enables efficient substitution of cash market
trades, transferring resources across time and space. Currency and interest
rate swap derivatives allow borrowers and investors to allocate or obtain
capital efficiently to and from the cheapest/most efficient foreign markets.
The final channel, the risk channel, enables investors to cap their ex-
posure to risky trades, enabling agents such as pension fund managers with
risk averse clients to increase potential yields while capping losses through
the purchase of put options. The importance of tail risk in the cost of pro-
viding this type of insurance is emphasised in Bakshi and Madan (2006) and
McGee and McGroarty (2017), who link it to the well-researched variance
risk premium in options markets. Evidence of the important risk manage-
ment role of options markets can be seen in Figure 2 that illustrates the
dollar volume of gold ETF options split into put and call volumes. The ratio
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Figure 1: SPX option monthly dollar volume split into call and put volumes covering
options with all expiries traded in a given month (source: Option Metrics).
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Figure 2: GLD ETF option monthly dollar volume split into call and put volumes covering
options with all expiries traded in a given month (source: Option Metrics). GLD options
started trading on the CBOE in June 2008.
of calls to puts is approximately 2:1 (compared to approximately 1:1 for the
SPX in Figure 1). This highlights the asymmetrical importance of gold as
a safe haven, as a call option on gold is equivalent to a put option on the
equity market in periods when the two are negatively correlated.
While the potential benefits of liquid derivatives markets are uncon-
tentious there is a question as to whether these come at too high a price,
as the complexity and high leverage available in the products also increases
risk exposure and leverages potential losses. This has led a number of re-
searchers to question whether financial derivatives were to blame for the
global financial crisis in 2008 (see e.g. Duffie (2008), Murphy (2009) and
Greenberg (2010)).
The ongoing challenge in derivatives markets is in how to continue to
encourage innovations that benefit the financial system while carefully regu-
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lating to mitigate the impact of leverage on systemic risk. The high leverage
available in derivatives markets can incentivise risk-taking in institutional
traders with an asymmetrical payoff function (who share in trading profits
but do not contribute to losses). Recent regulatory changes in 2014 in the
EU attempt to address this through limits on trading bonuses however, as
noted by Murphy (2013), regulatory intervention can have unintended nega-
tive consequences, potentially even increasing the risks it was introduced to
avoid.
Related with the OTC credit derivatives market, the CDS (Credit De-
fault Swaps) has attracted considerable attention specially since 2008. CDS
spreads are considered a good proxy for credit risk and default probabilities.
CDSs are also the most liquid credit derivative products and account for
about half the amount of credit derivatives traded on the derivatives market.
During the last years, the vulnerability of European markets has become
evident, affecting the real estate sector and causing a rapid deterioration in
major European economies, and to a greater extent in the distressed periph-
eral economies inside the Eurozone. As a consequence, a recent strand of
the literature analyses the channels of European credit risk transmission in
credit markets before and during this turbulent period. Understanding how
transmission works among financial institutions and/or sovereigns is key to
understanding the propagation of financial crises. Moreover, an understand-
ing of the dynamics of international risk transmission is key to regulators
and policy makers who need put in place a framework for the prevention of
contagion in financial markets.
Overall, the existing CDS literature has explored the connections be-
tween the CDS market and the bond and/or stock markets (see Blanco et al.
(2005), Forte and Pen˜a (2009), or Delatte et al. (2012), Guo et al. (2011),
amongst others). More recent articles have identified a number of conta-
gious relationships in the sovereign credit risk markets. Using CDS spread
changes, Caporin et al. (2013) show that the propagation of shocks in the
major Euro area countries has been remarkably constant during 2008 to
2011 even though, in a significant part of the sample, periphery countries
have been greatly affected by their sovereign debt and fiscal situations. Us-
ing the Granger-causality test Kalbaska and Gatkowski (2012) conclude that
sovereign risk is mainly concentrated in EU countries, while Ballester Miquel
et al. (2014) show evidence of a significant change in credit risk transmission
with the outbreak of the global financial crisis. The effect is striking from
eurozone banks to non-eurozone banks.
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Another strand of the literature focuses on the contagious relationships
between the sovereign and bank CDS markets (Alter and Schu¨ler (2012),
Dieckmann and Plank (2012)). Some studies focus on credit risk volatility
transmission. Groba et al. (2013) test the existence of cross-border volatility
effects between the central and the peripheral European Union (EU) coun-
tries. They show a significant volatility spillover from distressed to central
Eurozone economies leading to a significant impact on the default swap risk
premia. Using an asymmetric multivariate BEKK model, Alemany et al.
(2015) show that the global financial crisis that originated outside Europe is
characterised by unidirectional volatility spillovers in credit risk from inside
to outside the Eurozone. By contrast, the Eurozone debt crisis is revealed to
be local in nature with the Euro as the key element, suggesting a financial
market fragmentation within the Eurozone between distressed peripheral and
non-distressed core Eurozone countries, whereas retaining the local currency
has acted as a firewall.
2.12. Financial market wide dependences
International financial markets are a network, which are influenced by
the macro economy, policy decisions, and institutional factors. An impor-
tant element in future research regarding financial market connectedness –
and therefore the depth of integration – is not only the connectedness within
one asset class (e.g. equity markets) or between two asset classes (e.g. eq-
uities and bonds), but the simultaneous connectedness between a wide va-
riety of asset markets: equities, bonds, FX, commodities, bonds, housing
markets etc., within a country and across countries. By understanding the
time-varying relationship between the different asset classes, and how the
changing dependence structure between two markets affect the other mar-
kets, we can better understand financial market interconnectedness. Steps in
this direction are taken by Diebold and Yilmaz (2015) (and their related pa-
pers), their approach building on network analysis and GVAR models. Since
there are many markets and daily (or even higher) frequencies can be used,
developing models able to handle large data sets efficiently will be crucial.
Being able to forecast how connectedness changes over time, for exam-
ple due to the changing economic situation (e.g. business cycles), the pol-
icy environment (e.g. accommodating monetary policy), or the institutional
framework, will also be important, as is finding the common factors driving
connectedness between different asset classes. This would improve our abil-
ity to forecast financial markets and economic developments in general, and
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be useful for risk management purposes. For example, Minoiu et al. (2014)
use network analysis to find that financial connectedness can be useful in
predicting banking crises1. Using connectedness measures as an early warn-
ing indicator of crisis is of course an important application of system-wide
connectedness.
Using GVAR approach to evaluate contagion between the US and Eu-
ropean CDS banking market, Ballester et al. (2016) shows evidence of both
systematic and idiosyncratic contagion. Whereas systematic contagion was
the main factor during the global financial crisis of 2008, the idiosyncratic
component became more relevant during the subsequent eurozone debt crisis.
Furthermore, the methodology allows them to identify the transmitters and
receivers of contagion. They conclude that US banks were the transmitters
of systematic contagion in the context of the global financial crisis, with EU
banks being net receivers. By contrast, during the eurozone crisis, banks
in euro-peripheral countries transmit the idiosyncratic contagion, banks in
euro-core countries transmit the systematic one, whereas, US banks did not
receive instability from eurozone banks.
1The Introduction in Minoiu et al. (2014) gives a good overview of the current literature
on the relationship between business cycles and financial connectedness.
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